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Abstract – In the context of combined pool/bilateral op-
eration of electricity markets, this paper compares two
pricing strategies: pay-as-bid and the more conventional
marginal pricing. The pay-as-bid strategy defines three
types of services: bilateral contract generation, transmis-
sion loss and congestion management required by the bilat-
eral contracts, and pool demand generation including
associated transmission loss and congestion. A technique is
developed to unbundle these three services, thus identifying
the corresponding costs and power levels from the points of
view of both loads and generators. The unbundling process
follows an approach that integrates the cost and generation
components along a predefined load trajectory. The un-
bundled costs are useful economic signals for agents in
their choice of a beneficial mix of pool/bilateral trading.
Keywords: marginal pricing, pay-as-bid, pool operation,
bilateral contracts, cost unbundling, service unbundling,
economic signals.
1 INTRODUCTION
In general, two pricing strategies can be used in the
settlement of electricity markets. One is marginal pric-
ing, in which the most expensive scheduled generator
defines the system price. A second pricing approach,
referred to as pay-as-bid, pays each generator the actual
amount of its submitted bid.
Most electricity markets have adopted marginal pric-
ing, with the exception of the new trading agreement
rules in England & Wales that have moved from mar-
ginal pricing to a pay-as-bid scheme [1, 2]. Recent re-
search indicates that the latter approach may be benefi-
cial in overcoming some of the problems that arise in the
current market operation, that is, to reduce price volatil-
ity and discourage the exercise of market power [3].
Support for the pay-as-bid method however is not uni-
form, as some argue that its application may lead to
inefficiency and weaken competition [2, 4].
So far, research on pay-as-bid pricing has focused on
generator bidding strategies [2, 3, 5]. We feel however
that to develop informed bidding strategies, it is also
necessary to analyze the financial implications of spe-
cific pay-as-bid market rules. In this paper we consider a
pay-as-bid scheme based on the Auman-Shapley tech-
nique [8] and apply it to electricity markets that allow
combined pool/bilateral contract operation [6]. This type
of mixed electricity market is very general and can
model a pure pool or a pure bilateral market, as well as
mixtures of these.
Electricity markets generally trade various distinct
services, each of which has to be priced in some rational
and systematic manner. The services traded under the
combined pool/bilateral electricity market being studied
here are the supply of power to meet the pool and the
bilateral demands, as well as any associated transmis-
sion loss and congestion management. The Auman-
Shapley (AS) approach followed here offers features not
present in simpler pay-as-bid schemes such as pro-rata.
The AS approach accounts for losses and transmission
congestion in a piece-wise incremental manner that
uniquely unbundles the various services and allocates
them among the market players.
This paper compares conventional marginal pricing
with the proposed AS pay-as-bid approach in a com-
bined pool/bilateral market. The two pricing methods
are compared through costs, average prices, and reve-
nues and through payments from the perspective of the
generators, loads, and bilateral contract parties. The
combined pool/bilateral market is settled by a system
operator according to an AC optimal power flow that
accounts for bilateral contracts, transmission loss and
congestion management.
2 COMBINED POOL/BILATERAL
OPERATION
The studies of the two pricing mechanisms for com-
bined pool/bilateral dispatch examined in this paper are
based on the mathematical formulation defined in [6]
and summarized immediately below.
2.1 Pool and Bilateral Components of Generations and
Loads
In combined pool/bilateral operation, both the genera-
tion and demand vectors, gP and dP respectively, are
decomposed into bilateral and pool components,
p b p
g g g g= + = + ⋅P P P P GD e (1)
p b p T
d d d d= + = + ⋅P P P P GD e (2)
The ( n n× ) matrix, GD, describes the firm bilateral
contracts between generators and loads. The element
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ijGD represents a firm agreement by which generator i
is physically committed to produce this contracted
power level. Similarly, load j is obliged to consume the
same amount of power. For the sake of simplicity, it is
assumed that each bus has only one load and/or one
generator. In the above equations we have defined the
n -dimensional vector T=[1 1]e ! .
The bilateral generation component, bgP , supplies the
bilateral portion of the demand, bdP , so that total bilat-
eral output of each generator has to match all of its bi-
lateral agreements,
1
n
b
gi ij
j
P GD
=
= ∑ (3)
In a similar manner, the bilateral demand of each bus
j is denoted by,
1
n
b
dj ij
i
P GD
=
= ∑ (4)
The pool generation component, pgP , supplies both
the pool demand, pdP , as well as any transmission losses
and congestion re-dispatch due to the combined effect of
pool and bilateral demand.
2.2 Combined Pool/Bilateral Market Settlement
A generator i that wishes to participate in the spot
market submits to the ISO its cost curve bid/offer,
( )ii gC P together with its MW bilateral commitments1.
The total pool generation bid cost is then
1
( ) ( )i
n
g i g
i
C C P
=
= ∑P . These generation bids are submit-
ted to supply not just the pool demand, but also the total
system loss as well as any possible re-dispatch due to
transmission congestion, in other words to participate in
congestion management. The mixed pool/bilateral gen-
eration dispatch strategy followed by the ISO can then
be expressed by the following optimal power flow prob-
lem,
( )
g
gMin CP P (5)
s.t. g
b
g g
S∈
≥ = ⋅
P
P P GD e
The set S above denotes the security region of the
power system in the space of generation levels, gP .
Such a region is defined by the range of the generator
outputs, min maxg g g≤ ≤P P P , by the load flow equations,
( )g d= +P P P δ [7], and by the transmission flow limits,
max( )f f≤P Pδ . The vector of voltage phase angles is
denoted by δ , while the voltage magnitudes are as-
sumed to be equal 1.p.u. at all buses.
1 Under pay-as-bid generators bid above their true cost.
The solution of (5) yields the optimum levels of all the
above-mentioned decision variables, including the gen-
eration vector, *gP , as well as the nodal prices ! associ-
ated with the load flow equations.
The pool generation component can then be found by
subtracting the scheduled bilateral generation from the
total optimum generation, that is,
*p b
g g g= −P P P (6)
The solution of (5) also defines the individual and to-
tal generation costs, respectively, *( );i giC P i∀ and
* *( )i gi
i
C C P= ∑ .
3 MARGINAL PRICING APPROACH
The following revisits various financial performance
measures for generators and loads based on marginal
pricing [6] and on the results from (5) and (6):
• Revenue of generator i from pool generation,
p p
gi i giR Pλ= ⋅ (7)
• Expenditure of load j for pool demand,
p p
dj j djE Pλ= ⋅ (8)
• Revenue of generator i from bilateral contracts,
1
n
b b
gi ij ij
j
R GDpi
=
= ∑ (9)
• Expenditure of load j for its bilateral contracts,
1
n
b b
dj ij ij
i
E GDpi
=
= ∑ (10)
The bilateral contract rates, bijpi , are confidential pri-
vately negotiated long-term agreements between the
bilateral trading partners, generator i and load j . The
negotiated prices may differ from the nodal prices and
therefore lead to either a profit or a loss in comparison
with the spot market price.
Under marginal pricing, the incremental cost of trans-
ferring power from bus i to bus j is equal to the differ-
ence in nodal prices, that is, j iλ λ− . This rate defines
the amount charged by the pool to the bilateral exchange
ijGD for transmission loss and congestion manage-
ment2,
( )bclij j i ijE GDλ λ= − (11)
As bclijE is associated with a bilateral contract and not
uniquely with either the selling generator i or with the
buying load j, this payment can be split in arbitrary
proportions between the two participants. In this paper,
2 The superscript ‘bcl’ stands for bilateral-congestion-loss.
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this proportion is set to 50/50 so that the power transfer
payment assigned to generator i is / 2bclijE , with the
same amount charged to load j. Splits other than 50/50
can be negotiated but will affect the bilateral contract
price. Irrespective of the split, a large power transfer
payment for a specific contract acts as a disincentive and
will discourage future agreements between these two
partners.
Thus, the total power transfer expenditure of genera-
tor i for all its contracts is then,
( )
1
1
2
n
bcl
gi j i ij
j
E GDλ λ
=
= −∑ (12)
Similarly, the total power transfer expenditure of load
j for all its contracts is,
( )
1
1
2
n
bcl
dj j i ij
i
E GDλ λ
=
= −∑ (13)
Finally, the net revenue of generator i is,
p b bcl
gi gi gi giR R R E= + − (14)
while the total expenditure of load j is,
p b bcl
dj dj dj djE E E E= + + (15)
The total flow of expenditures and revenues under
marginal pricing in combined pool/bilateral markets can
now be summarized. We begin with the total expendi-
tures by the consumers,
( )
1 1 1 1
1 , 1 , 1
1
2
n n n n
total p b bcl
d dj dj dj dj
j j j j
n n n
p b
j dj ij ij j i ij
j i j i j
E E E E E
P GD GDλ pi λ λ
= = = =
= = =
= = + +
= + + −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
(16)
Similarly, the total net revenues by the generators are,
( )
1 1 1 1
1 , 1 , 1
1
2
n n n n
total p b bcl
g gi gi gi gi
i i i i
n n n
p b
i gi ij ij j i ij
i i j i j
R R R R E
P GD GDλ pi λ λ
= = = =
= = =
= = + −
= + − −
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
(17)
Under marginal pricing, the difference between the
total load expenditures and the total net generator reve-
nues is in general a positive quantity. This surplus is
referred to as the merchandising surplus, MS . These
monies remain with the ISO and are intended to cover
part of the network expenses including expansion. The
merchandising surplus also acts as an economic signal to
stimulate new additions to the network.
Marginal pricing does not guarantee positive genera-
tor profits, gi giR C− , particularly if the generator has
engaged in long-term bilateral agreements at insuffi-
ciently high rates, bijpi .
4 INTEGRATED MARGINAL PRICE
PAY-AS-BID METHOD
4.1 Unbundled Services and Costs
Here we propose a pay-as-bid pricing method for
combined pool/bilateral markets, where we distinguish
three services provided by the generators and received
by the consumers and by the bilateral contract parties.
From the point of view of generator ;i i∀ , these dis-
tinct services are:
• 
pcl
giP = generation component that supplies the pool
demand plus its share of loss and congestion
management.
• 
bcl
giP = generation component that supplies a share of
loss and congestion management allocated to all bi-
lateral contracts3.
• 
1
n
b
gi ij
j
P GD
=
= ∑ = generation component that supplies
the bilateral agreements between generator i and all
loads.
The total generation is the sum of these three ser-
vices,
1
n
pcl bcl b pcl bcl
gi gi gi gi gi gi ij
j
P P P P P P GD
=
= + + = + +∑ (18)
while the total pool generation is p pcl bclgi gi giP P P= + .
In this method, as in equation (2), each load j sub-
mits two demand components to the pool, namely, the
pool demand, pdjP , and the bilateral demand,
1
n
b
dj ij
i
P GD
=
= ∑ . The pool demand components, ;pdjP j∀ ,
are supplied by the generation service, ;pclgiP i∀ , while
the bilateral demand components, ;bdjP j∀ , are supplied
by the two generation services, ;bgiP i∀ , which is priced
by private agreements, and ;bclgiP i∀ , which is priced by
the ISO.
The costs of the services provided by generator i are:
• 
pcl
giC = generation cost component for the supply of
;pclgiP i∀ .
• 
bcl
giC = generation cost component for the supply of
;bclgiP i∀ .
3 Not just its own contracts. Thus, a generator with no bilateral
contracts can still supply some bclgiP .
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• 
b
giC = generation cost component for the supply of
1
n
b
gi ij
j
P GD
=
= ∑ .
The total generation cost *( )i giC P is the sum of these
three service costs,
*( ) pcl bcl bi gi gi gi giC P C C C= + + (19)
From the point of view of the loads, we define,
• 
p
djC = cost component allocated to load j for its
pool demand, pdjP .
From the point of view of the bilateral contracts, we
define,
• 
bcl
ijC = cost component allocated to bilateral con-
tract, ijGD , for the supply of associated loss and
congestion management.
• 
b
ijC = cost component allocated to the bilateral con-
tract between generator i and load j for the sup-
ply of ijGD .
• 
4.2 Reconciliation of Costs
Under the pay-as-bid scheme, the costs allocated to
the loads and bilateral contracts must exactly match the
generation cost components. Thus, for the supply of
pool demand and associated loss and congestion man-
agement, we have,
1 1
n n
pcl p
gi dj
i j
C C
= =
=∑ ∑ (20)
Similarly, for the services received by the bilateral
contracts, the financial balance equation for loss and
congestion management is,
1 1 1
n n n
bcl bcl
gi ij
i i j
C C
= = =
=∑ ∑∑ (21)
Finally, the costs of supplying power to the bilateral
contracts must satisfy,
1 1 1
n n n
b b
gi ij
i i j
C C
= = =
=∑ ∑∑ (22)
4.3 Calculation of Unbundled Generation and Cost
Components
The cost and generation unbundling follows an inte-
gration process [7, 8] that modifies the two load compo-
nents (bilateral and pool) in small increments, one at a
time. The optimum generation dispatch (5) is solved for
each intermediate value of the load components along a
linear uniform integration path4 from zero to their final
specified values. This path is characterized by a scalar
; 0 1t t≤ ≤ .
The integration process begins with all generation
and cost variables set to zero. Each integration step has
three parts that are now described.
(1) Integration sub-step 1:
• Increase only the bilateral contracts by dGD , keep-
ing pdd =P 0 .
• Solve (5) with new load levels for iλ , for the in-
cremental cost, iIC , and for
* ;gidP i∀ ,
• Then,
*
1
n
bcl
gi gi ij
j
dP dP dGD
=
= −∑ (23)
• For each i and j , calculate:
bcl bcl
gi i gidC dPλ= ⋅ (24)
b
ij i ijdC IC dGD= ⋅ (25)
1
n
b b
gi ij
j
dC dC
=
= ∑ (26)
1
n
b b
dj ij
i
dC dC
=
= ∑ (27)
( )bclij j i ijdC dGDλ λ= − ⋅ (28)
(2) Integration sub-step 2:
• Increase only the pool demand by pddP , while keep-
ing the bilateral contracts constant,
• Solve (5) with new load levels for iλ , iIC and
* ;gidP i∀
• Then,
*pcl
gi gidP dP= (29)
• For each i and j , calculate:
• 
pcl pcl
gi i gidC dPλ= ⋅ (30)
pcl p
dj i djdC dPλ= ⋅ (31)
(3) Integration of incremental variables:
The increments calculated above are added over a
sufficiently large number of integration steps [7] until
both the pool and the bilateral demands reach their final
values. The final integrated values define the desired
unbundled generation and cost components defined
earlier. Thus, denoting dx as any of the above incre-
4 Three possible integration paths could be defined: (a) inte-
grate by increasing a pool demand first, then bilateral; (b)
increase bilateral demand first, then pool; (c) increase both
demands simultaneously. In this paper the third approach is
applied, but within integration step a bilateral supply is in-
creased first.
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mental variables, its final integrated value is determined
by,
1
0
( )
t
x dx t
=
= ∫ (32)
4.4 Revenues and Expenditures
Under pay-as-bid pricing, the revenues of the genera-
tors and the payments of the loads and the bilateral con-
tracts must match the corresponding unbundled costs.
This is applicable only for those services managed by
the system operator.
pcl pcl bcl bcl
gi gi gi gi
p p bcl bcl
dj dj ij ij
R C R C
E C E C
= =
= =
(33)
On the other hand, the privately negotiated generator
revenues and load expenditures for the bilateral con-
tracts (excluding loss and congestion management) are
not necessarily equal to the corresponding unbundled
cost quantities,
1
n
b b b
gi ij ij gi
j
R GD Cpi
=
= ≠∑ (34)
1
n
b b b
dj ij ij dj
i
E GD Cpi
=
= ≠∑ (35)
As in marginal pricing, the payment bclijE is attributed
to both contract parties, and can be divided between
them in an arbitrary way. In this paper we have adopted
a 50/50 split so that the payment of generator i for all its
bilateral contracts is,
1
1
2
n
bcl bcl
gi ij
j
E E
=
= ∑ (36)
Similarly, the expenditure of load j becomes
1
1
2
n
bcl bcl
dj ij
i
E E
=
= ∑ (37)
Therefore, the net revenue of generator i is,
pcl bcl b bcl
gi gi gi gi giR R R R E= + + − (38)
Likewise, the total expenditure of load j is,
pcl bcl b
dj dj dj djE E E E= + + (39)
Figure 1 illustrates the monetary and information
flows between the ISO and generations and loads, as
well as between bilateral parties engaged in a trade.
These flows are based on the previously derived cost,
revenue and expenditure components.
Bilateral
market
ISO
Generator i Load j
1 ( )
2
bcl
j i ij gi
j
dGD Eλ λ− =∑ ∫
bcl bcl bcl
i gi gi gidP C Rλ = =∫
p p p
i dj dj djdP C Eλ = =∫
1 ( )
2
bcl
j i ij dj
i
dGD Eλ λ− =∑ ∫
b b
i ij dj dj
i
IC dGD C E= ≠∑∫
pcl pcl pcl
i gi gi gidP C Rλ = =∫
b b
i ij gi gi
j
IC dGD C R= ≠∑∫
b b
ij ij gi
j
dGD Rpi =∑
b b
ij ij dj
i
dGD Epi =∑
Figure 1:Implementation of Pay-As-Bid Method: Monetary and information flows
Under pay-as-bid, from (38) and (39), one can see
that the sum of the consumer expenditures,
1
n
dj
j
E
=
∑ , is
identical to the sum of the generator revenues,
1
n
gi
i
R
=
∑ ,
so that, in contrast with marginal pricing, the merchan-
dising surplus (MS) is nil. It can be argued that having
MS=0 is an advantage since it avoids having to distrib-
ute a non-zero MS among the various competing agents
in an ad-hoc manner. Moreover, zero MS removes any
financial interest on the part of the agents to increase the
size of the surplus. Payments to the transmission pro-
vider for transmission use will be based on a regulated
tariff. As will be seen in the simulation results, the ab-
sence of MS does not imply that bilateral contracts do
not incur power transfer expenditures. In fact, each
contract pays bclijC whose combined amount exactly
Information flow
Monetary flow
Legend:
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covers the total cost of generating the “bilateral conges-
tion loss” components, bclgiP .
5 COMPARATIVE STUDIES
A 5-bus network [5] is used to evaluate the financial
performance measures for the proposed pay-as-bid strat-
egy, and to compare them with the marginal pricing
method. In this example, the fixed generator costs are
set to zero. When these are non-zero, they are allocated
among the pool and bilateral components in a pro-rata
manner.
The system demand of 1088 MW is distributed
among the network buses according to,
[34 85 119 323 527]b p Td d MW+ =P P (40)
The firm bilateral contracts are,
33.4 50.1 33.4 150.3 167
0 33.4 33.4 116.9 250.5
0 0 50.1 50.1 100.2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
MW
 
 
 
 =
 
 
  
GD (41)
Thus, the total system load is divided among the bi-
lateral and pool markets in the proportion of 98%
(1068.8 MW) for bilateral contracts and 2% (19.2 MW)
for pool demand. After solving the minimum cost dis-
patch (5), this pattern of pool and bilateral demand
causes generator 1 to operate out of merit and congests
line 1-4.
In this simulation, the bilateral tariffs were chosen by,
( )
i
i
b bi
ij g
g
dC P j
dP
pi = ∀ (42)
Table 1 summarizes the results of the unbundling
process for 1000 integration steps. The integration path
followed increases both bilateral and pool demands
simultaneously and uniformly across all nodes. Table 1
shows the bus optimal generation and load components,
the nodal prices, the bilateral tariffs, and the optimal
generation costs. Under marginal pricing, only the total
pool generation component, pgP , is determined and used
for financial calculations. However, the pay-as-bid ap-
proach decomposes it further into “only pool supply”,
pcl
gP , and the bilateral services component,
bcl
gP .
Further results comparing the marginal pricing and inte-
grated “pay-as-bid” methods are shown in Tables 2 and
3, respectively. Examining the total revenues and ex-
penditures reveals that both generators and loads are
better off under the integration pay-as-bid mechanism
compared to marginal pricing, primarily due to the ab-
sence of merchandising surplus. Nevertheless, genera-
tors are still responsible for half of the power transfer
payments for their bilateral contracts. Under pay-as-bid
the total of such power transfer payments is 767 $/h
versus 2473 $/h under marginal pricing. This difference
that applies equally for both generators and loads is
particularly significant under congestion. From the point
of view of pool generation, however, we see from Ta-
bles 2 and 3 that the general tendency is for generators
to earn less under pay-as-bid.
Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Sum
b
gP 434.2 434.2 200.4 0 0 1,068.8
bcl
gP -4.1 1.9 50.6 0 0 48.4
pcl
gP 4.1 12.2 3.7 0 0 20
p
gP 0 14.2 54.2 0 0 68.3
gP 434.2 448.4 254.6 0 0 1,137.1
*
b
dP 33.4 83.5 116.9 317.3 517.3 1,068.8
*
p
dP 0.6 1.5 2.1 5.7 9.3 19.2
* dP 34 85 119 323 527 1,088
λ 32.5 34.4 36.5 37.8 40.8 -
*
b
gpi 37.4 34 34 56 57 -
gC 12,455 12,431 7,823 0 0 32,708
Table 1: Summary of unbundled generation services.
Power in MW, λ and bgpi in $/MWh, and gC in $/h. The rows
marked with an asterisk contain given data. All other val-
ues are calculated by the optimization.
Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Sum
b
gR 16,225 14,774 6,817 0 0 37,816
p
gR 0 488 1,975 0 0 2,463
bcl
gE 1,198 1,024 251 0 0 2,473
gR 15,027 14,238 8,541 0 0 37,807
b
dE 1,248 3,009 4,089 11,298 18,173 37,816
bcl
dE 0 48 99 619 1,707 2,473
p
dE 19.5 51.7 76.6 215.2 379.6 742.6
dE 2,465 4,084 4,416 11,514 18,552 41,032
Table 2: Marginal pricing approach; revenues and expen-
ditures are in $/h.
We can also see from Tables 1 and 3 that there can
exist some negative generation and cost components.
This is due to the presence of excessively high bilateral
generation levels that force generators to operate out of
merit. For example, generator 1 has negative revenue of
-100.3 $/h for its “ bilateral loss congestion” component.
This is an effective financial “signal” indicating that its
choice of bilateral contracts is inefficient.
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Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Sum
b b
g gR C≠ 16,225 14,774 6,817 0 0 37,816
bcl bcl
g gR C= -100.3 -65.1 1,697.8 0 0 1,532.4
pcl pcl
g gR C= 90.3 352 121.7 0 0 564
p p
g gR C= -10 286.9 1,819.5 0 0 2,096.4
bcl
gE 324.7 358.4 84 0 0 767
gR 15,891 14,703 8,553 0 0 39,147
b
dE 1,248 3,009 4,089 11,298 18,173 37,816
bcl
dE 0 5.6 28.7 159.7 573.1 767
p
dE 16.6 41.8 60.1 164.8 280.6 564
dE 1,265 3,056 4,178 11,623 19,026 39,147
Table 3: Integrated pay-as-bid approach; revenues and ex-
penditures in $/h.
Another important by-product of the integration un-
bundling method, are the cost components bgiC and
b
djC .
For example, generator i would consider its bilateral
contracts profitable if its net bilateral contract revenue
exceeds its allocated bilateral cost,
b bcl b
gi gi giR E C− > (43)
Similarly, load j would be satisfied with its negoti-
ated bilateral contracts if its total bilateral contract pay-
ment is less than its allocated bilateral cost,
b bcl b
dj dj djE E C+ < (44)
Referring to Table 4, this simulation shows that all
three generators have beneficial bilateral deals. In con-
trast the loads are all paying more in bilateral services
than their allocated costs. In future negotiations, the
loads may opt to buy more from the pool or renegotiate
their bilateral deals. As can be seen from the last two
rows of Table 4, the average prices paid by the loads for
pool demand are considerably lower than the average
prices paid for bilateral demand.
Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3 Bus 4 Bus 5 Sum
b
gC 12,468 12,147 6,005 0 0 30,621
b bcl
g gR E− 15,901 14,416 6,733 0 0 38,584
b
dC 959 2,373 3,395 9,088 14,806 30,621
b bcl
d dE E+ 1,248 3,014 4,117 11,458 18,746 37,049
( ) /b bcl bd d dE E P+ 37.4 36.1 35.2 36.1 36.2 -
/p pd dE P 27.7 27.9 28.6 28.9 30.2 -
Table 4: Comparison of allocated bilateral costs and net
bilateral revenues and expenditures ($/h). Average bilat-
eral and pool load prices ($/MWh).
In the previous analysis the method was illustrated on
a 5-bus system. To reduce the computational time in
realistic-sized networks, it is possible to first calculate
unbundled costs for a smaller number of integration
steps, and then normalize the approximate generator
costs and load payments to ensure that their sums equal
their exact final values. Table 5 illustrates the effect of
the number of steps on the integration process for a
modified IEEE 24 bus system. The estimated unbundled
costs given in rows 4-7 are normalized as indicated
above, and reveal that even with a reduced number of
steps sufficient unbundling accuracy is obtained.
Number of Integration Steps
10 100 1000 2000 4000
C 40,302 40,302 40,302 40,302 40,302
gC 39,962 40,268 40,299 40,301 40,302
.dC 39,951 40,270 40,299 40,301 40,302
ˆ ˆpcl pcl
g dC C= 33,399 33,103 33,074 33,072 33,071
ˆ ˆ
b b
g dC C= 6,941 7,232 7,261 7,262 7,263
ˆ ˆ
bcl bcl
g dC C= -17 -9 -8 -8 -8
ˆ ˆwcl wcl
g dC C= -22 -24 -24 -24 -24
Table 5: Unbundled costs vs. number of integration steps
for modified IEEE 24bus system with 83% of pool and
17% bilateral supply, as well as a wheeling contract be-
tween buses 3 and 20.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In the context of combined pool/bilateral operation of
electricity markets, this paper compares two pricing
strategies: pay-as-bid and the more conventional mar-
ginal pricing. The pay-as-bid strategy defines three types
of services: bilateral contract generation, transmission
loss and congestion management required by the bilat-
eral contracts, and pool demand generation including
associated transmission loss and congestion. A tech-
nique is developed to unbundle these three services, thus
identifying the corresponding costs and power levels
from the points of view of both loads and generators.
The unbundling process follows an approach that inte-
grates the cost and generation components along a pre-
defined load trajectory. The results suggest that under
transmission congestion the pay-as-bid approach is
beneficial for both loads and generators due to the ab-
sence of a merchandising surplus. As a result, the power
transfer payments are considerably reduced for both
generators and loads. The specific simulation test case
clearly indicates that the average price for pool demand
is lower than the average price for bilateral demand. The
unbundled costs are therefore useful economic signals
for agents in their choice of a beneficial mix of
pool/bilateral trading. In this example, the loads would
either renegotiate their bilateral deals or switch to a
greater proportion of pool demand.
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